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ENHANCING SENTENCES FOR PAST
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: THE UNLIKELY
INTERSECTION OF ILLEGAL REENTRY
AND SEX CRIMES
Abby Pringle*
This Comment explores the evolving understanding of when a sex
offense may (and should) be considered a crime of violence sufficient to
elicit the maximum enhancement available for illegal reentry crimes under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The meaning of the term 'forcible sex
offense," though appearing in the commentary applicable only to a single
Guideline, has created a persistent circuit split with implications for the
development of Guidelines sentencing, the criminalization of immigration
offenses, and state laws defining sexual offenses. This Comment introduces
the Guidelines sentencing regime and conventions ofjudicial interpretation
that serve as the foundation for the controversy, examines the state and
federal laws at issue, and discusses origins of the split and the practical
effects of its resolution for several areas of law, ultimately recommending
that the Commission create a separate category of enhancement for sex
offenses outside the crime of violence context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2L1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the
Guidelines) delineates a graduated sentencing scheme for the offense of
unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States following a prior
removal. The scheme provides four levels of enhancements for defendants
whose prior removal was upon conviction of a crime.2 The severity of the
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2010. Immeasurable
thanks to my family for their unflagging support, with special thanks to my grandparents,
Leonard and Shirley Ely, for instilling the importance of education and providing countless
opportunities. Thanks also to Mom, Dad, David and Will for your examples of so many
ways to be brilliant.




enhancement is determined by the nature of the offense for which the
defendant was removed, with the highest level reserved for the most
culpable and dangerous offenses. One way the Guidelines make this
distinction is by labeling an offense a "crime of violence," a term that is
defined differently under section 2L1.2 than elsewhere in the Guidelines or
the United States Code.3 The United States Sentencing Commission has
revised the section 2L1.2 definition of "crime of violence" several times to
more accurately reflect the purposes of punishment in general and
punishment of illegal reentry in particular.4 Since 2001, that definition has
laid out two paths by which a court may label an offense a crime of
violence: (1) it may be one of a number of enumerated crimes considered
per se crimes of violence, or (2) it may fall under a more general, catchall
description of crimes that involve actual, attempted, or threatened physical
force.'
The courts have not, however, been in accord as to whether and how
certain crimes fit into either definition. The most recent question to split
the circuits is what range of crimes constitutes "forcible sex offenses," one
of the enumerated crimes of violence.6  In 2008, the Sentencing
Commission set forth amendments to the Guidelines that explicitly
addressed a split among the appellate circuits as to whether a "forcible sex
offense" requires that the use of physical force be an element of the
offense.7 The amendment clarified that, consistent with the evolution of
state rape laws, "forcible sex offense" means any sexual contact that occurs
against the will of the victim.
8
This Comment examines the meaning of "forcible sex offense" under
section 2L1.2 as part of a historical pattern and considers its implications
going forward. Part II explores the crime of illegal reentry and the
development of the accompanying sentencing regime. This Part also
introduces the purposes of punishment and the Guidelines generally, and
the purpose and development of section 2L1.2 in particular. Part III
addresses the evolving definitions of "crime of violence" and "forcible sex
offense," explaining the differences in interpretation that created the circuit
split and the Commission's responses. Part IV briefly addresses the history
of rape and sex offense law in the United States and considers the impact of
3 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
' See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006) (explaining that the Sentencing Commission must
"periodically review and revise" the Guidelines); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the
function of commentary to the Guidelines).
5 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(ii).
6 See United States v. Chacon, 533 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the split).




that history on the current controversy. Finally, Part V discusses the
intersection of sex offenses and immigration crimes in section 2L1.2 and
the practical implications for each. This Comment suggests that the best
way to synthesize and further the purposes of all of these competing aspects
is to remove sex offenses from the "crime of violence" definition entirely
and create a separate category of enhancement. Doing so harmonizes
several purposes and concerns around this difficult area of law. The
solution recognizes that sex offenders are dangerous and deserving of
punishment and exclusion, but allows gradations among sex offenses to
meet the stated purpose of assigning harsh punishments to only the most
deserving offenders. The separation is also consistent with the movement
toward understanding rape as a crime against individual autonomy rather
than a crime of physical violence.
II. THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT OF ILLEGAL REENTRY
The criminalization of immigration violations remains a relatively
young area of law.9 Regulation of immigration is traditionally a federal
administrative function, whereas state judiciaries claim primary
responsibility for the enforcement of criminal law. Though increasingly
integrated, the two regimes still operate independently-and often ignore
the effects of the other.'
0
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 AND SECTION 2L1.2
Section 2L1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual governs
criminal penalties for "Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United
States" following a prior removal.' 1 Specifically, section 2L1.2 applies to
the "illegal reentry" crimes described by 8 U.S.C. § 1326.12 Subsection (a)
9 See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 264, 264
(2006).
1o Id. at 265 & n.21 (noting that some areas of immigration law impose criminal
sanctions, but these sanctions are accompanied by removal or other immigration sanctions).
I1 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2. For the purpose of this Comment,
the relevant segment of section 2L 1.2 is subsection (b)(1)(A), addressing the specific offense
characteristics that merit a sixteen-level sentence enhancement, applicable where
the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after... a
conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed
exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography
offense; (v) a national security or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an
alien smuggling offense.
12 Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. Section 2L1.2 also applies to a second or subsequent violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1325(a), which, in pertinent part, punishes any non-citizen who "(1) enters or
attempts to enter the United States... or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United States by a
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of this provision makes it a crime for any previously removed alien to
"enter[], attempt[] to enter, or ... at any time [be] found in, the United
States" regardless of the reason for his removal.13 Conviction under
subsection (a) carries a maximum prison sentence of two years. 14
Subsection (b), to which section 2L1.2 most often applies, increases the
punishment for aliens removed under specific circumstances. Section
1326(b)(2), for example, provides a statutory maximum of twenty years
imprisonment for an alien "whose removal was subsequent to a conviction
for commission of an aggravated felony."15
Section 1326 essentially makes reentry a strict liability crime. Though
a general intent to reenter the country is required, specific intent is not;1
6
once an offender is "found," he has no meaningful defense.'7 Accordingly,
99.3% of immigration convictions during the last fiscal year for which data
are available were the result of a guilty plea. 18 The statute provides
minimal gradation or specificity within the range of conduct it prohibits;
since section 2L1.2 does create gradations (ableit based on the offense for
which the noncitizen was removed from the country), the Guideline
assumes a central role in defining culpability.
Here the tension between criminal law and immigration law begins to
emerge. Immigration law, like criminal law, regulates the relationship
between the individual and the state, but the former has traditionally been
understood as an exercise of state power to exclude individuals "whose
presence in the country [Congress] deems hurtful."'19 Regardless of the
facial similarities between an immigration adjudication and a criminal
willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact." 8
U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
" 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006).
14 id.
15 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2); see infra note 81 (discussing the use and meaning of
"aggravated felony").
16 See, e.g., Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1968),
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2005)
("The government need only prove that the accused is an alien and that he illegally entered
the United States after being deported according to law. An allegation of willfulness is
unnecessary .. "). While this interpretation is universally accepted when an alien "enters"
or is "found" in the United States, the appellate courts disagree as to whether the same is true
for an attempted reentry. See, e.g., James A. Fortosis, Through the Funnel of Abstraction:
Why Specific Intent Should Be the Required Mens Reafor Attempted Illegal Reentries, 2007
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 503, 505-06.
17 Jane L. McClellan & Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy
Paradox of Early Disposition Programs: A Primer on "Fast-Track" Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 517, 521 (2006).
18 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 11
(2008), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Table 11.pdf.
19 Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
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proceeding, a deportation decision "is not a conviction of crime, nor is the
deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to
harbor persons whom it does not want., 20  The distinction is important,
because noncitizens in immigration hearings do not have the same
procedural rights as defendants in criminal trials, regardless of citizenship
status.2' Immigration defendants are entitled only to the constitutional
guarantee of due process.22
The Supreme Court maintains (albeit tenuously) that § 1326(b) does
not violate due process by relying on these administrative deportation
decisions to differentiate the level of punishment from that available under
§ 1326(a).23 In so deciding, however, the Court explicitly expressed no
view as to whether the holding applies to sentencing determinations based
24on decisions that bear "significantly" on the severity of the sentence. In
the context of illegal reentry, immigration decisions provide not only an
element of the strict liability crime under § 1326 but also the basis for both
determining and enhancing the Guidelines sentence. The Guidelines,
however, deal explicitly with the criminal system, and the Sentencing
Commission assumes a defendant subject to sentencing has received the
benefits of that system's attendant guarantees.
B. THE ROLE OF THE GUIDELINES AND THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION
To understand how and why the "forcible sex offense" controversy
arose (and may reasonably be resolved), some background on the
Sentencing Guidelines and the purposes Congress seeks to achieve through
sentencing is necessary. This history and structure both affect the ways in
20 Id.
21 See Stumpf, supra note 9, at 265 & n.36.
22 Id. Immigration hearings do not recognize other constitutional protections associated
with criminal defendants, such as the right to confront witnesses or to a public trial. See U.S.
CONST., amend VI; infra note 179 and accompanying text.
23 In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the Court found that the
prior felony or aggravated felony included in subsection (b) is merely a sentencing
enhancement rather than elements of a separate crime. Id. at 247; see also Stumpf, supra
note 9, at 235-39. The 5-4 decision carved out an exception to the rule announced two years
later in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that any fact that increased a sentence
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority opinion in Apprendi
acknowledged that Almendarez-Torres conflicted with the general rule Apprendi solidified
but maintained what is often referred to as the "recidivism exception" on the grounds that the
prior convictions had already been subjected to constitutional scrutiny. Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 496. Apprendi also noted, however, that it was possible that Almendarez-Torres was
incorrectly decided. Id. at 489 & n. 15.
24 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 247-48.
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which the Guidelines are interpreted and necessarily inform the proper
solution to any controversy.
A few unique features of the Guidelines make implementation unlike
that of other federal statutes. First, the Sentencing Commission plays a role
different from that of a legislative body, but one that is also not directly
analogous to other administrative bodies.26  Though considered an
"independent agency in every relevant sense,, 27 the Commission is situated
by statute in the judiciary. This placement insulates the Commission from
much of the reach of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, the source
of judicial authority to review the actions and interpretations of
administrative agencies. 28  Within the realm of its expertise, the
Commission is not only the creator and proponent of its own "legislative
rules," but it also monitors the rules' success and suggests amendments.29
Crucially, the Commission also has primary authority, recognized by the
Supreme Court, to resolve disagreements among appellate circuits as to
substantive questions of Guideline interpretation where they arise.3 °
Second, albeit relatedly, the relationship between the Commission and
the courts is unusual. The Commission's roles include both regulation of
judicial discretion and aid in judicial interpretation.31 In both functions, the
Commission speaks through commentary accompanying the Guidelines.
The commentary binds the courts, though it is not reviewed by Congress
and may be inconsistent with judicial precedent.32
25 See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996) (citing with approval then-
Judge Breyer's statement in United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993) that
proper application of a Guideline requires examination of the "structure and theory of both
relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole").
26 See John P. Jurden, United States v. Muschik: An Administrative Law Critique of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines' Ability to Override Judicial Statutory Interpretations, 80
MINN. L. REv. 469, 475-76 (1995).
27 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989).
28 See Jurden, supra note 26.
29 See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991) ("[C]ongress necessarily
contemplated that the Commission would periodically review the work of the courts, and
would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions
might suggest.").
30 Id. (stating that while the Court usually considers the prerogative to resolve disputes
among appellate circuits "initially and primarily [theirs] ... this may not be Congress' intent
with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines"); see also Jurden, supra note 26, at 480
(explaining that the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act shows that Congress
intended the Commission to be the "primary means" of resolving circuit splits).
31 Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348.
32 United States v. Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993). See infra Part II.B.2 for further
discussion on the role of commentary in the Guidelines.
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In establishing the Sentencing Commission, Congress identified a
handful of purposes for criminal sentences: retribution, education,
deterrence, and incapacitation.33 The resulting Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA) charged the Commission with promulgating guidelines to
further these purposes and simultaneously reducing the sentencing
disparities observed under a discretionary sentencing regime. 4 The SRA
commands that a sentence be "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to
achieve these goals.35 When first enacted, the SRA required courts to
adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines unless a departure was specifically
warranted by the circumstances.36 The Supreme Court declared the
Guidelines advisory in 2005, 37 returning discretion in sentencing decisions
to district judges, subject to appellate review for "reasonableness" and
consistency with the policy purposes of sentencing.38
1. Basic Sentencing Methodology
The Sentencing Guidelines can be desribed as "a long set of
instructions for one chart: the sentencing table... , which has 43 offense
levels, 6 criminal history categories, and 258 sentencing range boxes." 39 To
determine the appropriate prison term, a sentencing court: (1) identifies the
proper Guideline (or Guidelines) to provide the "base level" for the offense;
(2) applies relevant adjustments based on "specific offense characteristics"
or special instructions contained within the Guideline; (3) applies
adjustments related to the victim, the offender's role in the crime,
obstruction of justice, or acceptance of responsibility; (4) determines the
appropriate category for the offender's criminal history; and (5) consults the
33 See LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, CONG. RES. SERV., REP. No. RL32766,
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS
10-11 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf.
34 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA.2 (2008).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006) lays out the purposes of sentencing as:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant; (D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3626 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006).
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1); see also Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and
Sentencing After Booker, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2008).
37 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See infra Part II.C.1, discussing the
impact of Booker.
38 See Harrison, supra note 36, at 1123-24; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
39 Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1324-35 (2005).
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Sentencing Table 40 to determine the sentence range based on the
intersection of the specific offense level and the offender's criminal history
41
category. Once the range has been determined, the court also considers
the use of alternative forms of punishment and whether departures are
42
appropriate under the circumstances.
2. The Function of Commentary
The controversy surrounding the "crime of violence" enhancement at
issue in this Comment involves a definition contained in the commentary
accompanying section 2L1.2 rather than the Guideline itself. The Supreme
Court's position with respect to commentary to the Guidelines is that where
the commentary "does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it
must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. ' 43 Even commentary, however, must be
read to be harmonious with the plain text of the Guideline; where any
inconsistency arises, the plain text controls.44 Amended commentary is
similarly binding on the courts regardless of the fact that the amendments
are not reviewed by Congress; the Commission's most recent interpretation
trumps any preceding judicial interpretation.45
Though the Guidelines are now advisory, the commentary still holds
the weight of the Commission's reasoning.46  The definitions and
clarifications within the commentary continue to help courts parse meaning
from abstract or general language in the Guidelines-such as whether a
prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence as the Commission
understood that term under the definition specific to section 2L 1.2.
40 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2008), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2008guid/5a SenTab.htm. The Sentencing Table is a grid, the
horizontal axis of which represents the level assigned to the offender's criminal history, and
the vertical axis of which represents the offense level calculated under the appropriate
guideline. The intersection of the two provides the range, in months, within which the
sentence should fall.
41 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1.1.
42 Id.
43 United States v. Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (internal quotations omitted) (finding
the commentary to the Guidelines analogous to a federal agency's interpretation of its own
legislative rules).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Rising Sun, 522 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).
41 Id at 46-47 (holding that the amended definition of "crime of violence" for purposes
of section 4B1.2 was binding on the courts).
46 For a discussion of the impact of Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), see
infra Part II.C. 1.
47 This argument is subject to the same considerations, of course, as noted with regard to
the Court's reluctance to resolve circuit disagreements over Guideline interpretation. See
infra Part tl.B.3. Decisions since Booker continue to look to the commentary for guidance,
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C. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE GUIDELINES
1. Booker and the Advisory Nature of the Guidelines
In 2005, fewer than twenty years after the first Sentencing Guidelines
went into effect, the Supreme Court ended the federal experiment with
determinate sentencing.45 In United States v. Booker, the Court held that
the mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution because they gave the power to find essential facts to
the judge rather than the jury.49  As a remedy, the Court excised the
mandatory provision from the United States Code. 50 The introduction to the
current version of the Guidelines Manual addresses the altered nature of
advisory guidelines; according to Booker, advisory guidelines still serve to
further congressional objectives, including providing certainty and fairness in meeting
the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted .... [Advisory guidelines] continue[] to assure transparency by requiring
that sentences be based on articulated reasons stated in open court that are subject to
appellate review ... [and to] promote certainty and predictability in sentencing ....
The post-Booker era has seen the rise of a host of disparities in
Guideline interpretation. The Supreme Court continues in its reluctance to
review conflicting interpretations of specific Guidelines, deferring to the
Commission's expertise and obligation to "periodically review and revise"
52
as appropriate.53  The Court's post-Booker decisions have addressed
questions relating to the appropriate standards of appellate review and the
whereas the question of more liberal grants of certiorari has not been directly addressed.
See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 557 F.3d 489, 498 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that
commentary should continue to be considered binding unless it contravened the Guideline or
other statute); accord, United States v. Hawkins, 554 F.3d 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Mohr, 551 F.3d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Morries, 562 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, 568 F.3d 923, 927 (1 1th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Valenzuela, 495 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007).
48 Booker, 543 U.S. at 220.
49 Id. at 235.
50 Id. at 259.
51 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(2) (2008).
52 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2000).
53 See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991) (explaining that congressional
intent regarding the function of the Commission requires the Court to be "more restrained
and circumspect" in granting certiorari to resolve conflicts among lower courts'
interpretations of the Guidelines).
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scope of discretion permitted at the trial court level,54 an area better suited
to the expertise of the Court than that of the Commission.55
One should note, however, that the last time the Court acknowledged
its "restrained" use of certiorari to resolve substantive Guidelines disputes
was in an opinion delivered while the Guidelines were still mandatory.56
Does the timing matter? It may be irrelevant in light of Booker's clear
affirmation of the Commission's expertise and ownership of the Guidelines.
Alternatively, if, because the Guidelines are no longer binding, lower courts
continue to diverge in their interpretations of a Guideline in spite of an
amendment to a guideline, the Court may have occasion to step in to
enforce the "appropriate" interpretation through binding precedent. The
definition of forcible sex offense may present such an opportunity.
2. The Categorical Approach
Another critical element in Guidelines sentencing is the Commission's
choice to base sentences on the elements of the offense with which a
defendant is charged rather than the particular facts of the offense.57 Courts
have formulated many manifestations of this "charge offense" sentencing to
fit different Guidelines. 8 When making an "individualized" determination
as to whether a defendant's prior conviction is a crime of violence under
section 2L1.2, the sentencing court is bound by the "categorical" (or
"modified categorical") approach 59 laid out in Taylor v. United States60 and
54 In addition to excising the mandatory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000),
Booker also excised the standard of appellate review for mandatory guidelines, former 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000 & Supp. 2004). Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60, 271.
55 The Court's primary decisions are Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (holding
that an appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness to
a sentence within the range provided by the appropriate Guideline); Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38 (2007) (finding that courts of appeals must review a sentence imposed by the
district court under an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of the degree of departure
from the Guidelines); and Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (finding that
district courts may rely in part on policy disagreements with the Guidelines in imposing a
sentence, and that such reliance is not grounds for automatic reversal under the abuse-of-
discretion standard). Recently, the Court also reaffirmed a subset of its holdings in Rita and
Kimbrough. First, in Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009) (per curiam), the Court
announced that Kimbrough permits a judge to categorically reject and vary from the crack-
cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement. Id. at 843-44. Second, a unanimous
Court, in Nelson v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 890 (2009), clarified that while an appellate
court may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range,
the sentencing court may not. Id. at 892.
56 Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348.
57 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELrNES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a) (2008).
58 id.




clarified and reaffirmed in Shepard v. United States.61  The approach
permits the sentencing court to look only to the "statutory definitions of the
prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those
convictions. 62  If the statute covers a broad range of conduct, the
"modified" approach allows (but does not require) the court to look to a
limited set of court documents to determine the relevant section under
which the defendant was charged.63
Ultimately, the categorical approach protects defendants from being
retried for the underlying offense and makes the task of the sentencing court
one of statutory interpretation rather than adjudication of guilt.64  The
modified categorical approach allows the court to further the policy of
imposing harsher punishments on more dangerous offenders, even within a
single offense.65
The difficulty with this approach is that few underlying crimes are
defined by federal law 6 6-and in the case of sex crimes, that number is
essentially zero.67 The resulting sentencing decisions are based not
necessarily on the actions of a defendant but rather on the language of a
wide variety of state statutes. While general trends emerge in the
progression of rape law on a national scale, enormous diversity in state
approaches is equally apparent-especially in the divisions and grading of
60 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
6' 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
62 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
63 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. The court may look to "the terms of the charging document,
the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable
judicial record of this information." Id.
64 This is particularly appropriate in the context of convictions for illegal re-entry, in
which a defendant is guilty merely by "being found" in the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
(2006).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
66 The power to define and enforce criminal law is traditionally reserved to the states
under the federal system. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991) ("Under
our constitutional system, the primary responsibility for defining crimes against state law,
fixing punishments for the commission of these crimes, and establishing procedures for
criminal trials rests with the States.").
67 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding that Congress
overstepped its authority under the Commerce Clause and violated federalism principles in
creating a civil remedy for victims of gender-based violence as part of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994). Federal law may be implicated, however, if a sex offender takes a
victim over state lines in order to commit the offense. A recent example is the conviction of
evangelist Tony Alamo for violations of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (2006), an
early twentieth century law prohibiting, among other things, moving women across state
lines for "immoral purposes." See Jon Gambrell, Jurors Convict Evangelist on 10 Sex-Abuse
Counts, Assoc. PREss, July 24, 2009.
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offenses and the gravity of the particular facts to be proved.68 The fact that
courts are not obligated to employ the more individualized "modified"
categorical approach to the statutory definition further aggravates disparities
in court interpretations. Though most courts, faced with a broad or lengthy
statute, choose to narrow the scope of their inquiry, those that opt for a
formalistic categorical approach (that is, considering whether all conduct
covered by the entire statute can be classified as a crime of violence) add
another layer of confusion to the mix. 6
9
III. FORCIBLE SEX OFFENSES AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
The term "crime of violence" appears frequently throughout the
federal criminal codes, often as means by which legislators designate
certain actions as more culpable or deserving of punishment than others.70
Within the Sentencing Guidelines, there are two definitions of "crime of
violence," both meant to differentiate offenses the Commission deems
deserving of greater punishment.7 ' As originally laid out by the SRA,7z
there are four primary purposes to be achieved in imposing a sentence: (1)
"to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment"; (2) to deter criminal conduct in general; (3) to
"protect the public" by deterring the individual offender from further
68 See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 297, 307-09 (8th ed. 2007). For
an overview of the progression of rape and sexual assault law, see infra Part IV.A.
69 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2006),
for example, recognized the circuit's inconsistent application of the two approaches. In
Meraz-Enriquez, the information to which the defendant pled guilty was not part of the
record. Id. at 333 n.2. The opinion noted that while they were permitted to narrow the scope
of a broad statute, as the en banc court did in United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), they would follow the reasoning of United States v. Sarmiento-
Funes, 374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2004), discussed infra Part III.C; where the statute
criminalized sexual contact effectuated by legally-invalid consent-in-fact, it was not a crime
of violence. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d at 333 & n.2.
70 See, e.g., United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the crime of violence distinction was intended to "differentiate among crimes and to
apply more severe sanctions to a limited class of especially heinous offenses").
71 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 632 (2001).
72 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3626 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998). The federal statutes
creating the United States Sentencing Commission and providing for sentencing structure
were enacted as part of a larger Comprehensive Crime Act, which, in turn, was part of an
appropriations bill. The portion of the Act creating the United States Sentencing
Commission and instructing it to create sentencing guidelines for the federal courts is known
as the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N,
FIFTEEN YEARS OF FEDERAL SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL




criminal conduct; and (4) to provide the most effective correctional
treatment for the offender.73 Increasing sentences based on the violent
nature of a crime is one way the Sentencing Commission seeks to further
these purposes.
74
A. DEFINITIONS UNDER THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Before 2001, the Guidelines defined "crime of violence" only once, in
section 4B1.2, as an offense that: "(1) has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (2)
is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another." 75 Section 2L1.2 (and any other Guideline that referred to
crimes of violence) incorporated this definition.76 In its 2001 amendments
to the Guidelines, the Commission replaced wholesale the existing section
2L1.2, severing the meaning of "crime of violence" (and certain other
stipulations) from the section 4B1.2 definition.77 The purpose of the change
was to create a "graduated" enhancement structure for the crime of
unlawful reentry, using the seriousness of the prior crime as a proxy for the
dangerousness and culpability of the defendant. 78 The Commission acted
largely in response to the concerns of judges, attorneys, and law
enforcement officials that the existing structure imposed unnecessarily
harsh punishments on some less-deserving offenders.79 The practical effect,
they feared, was greater sentencing disparities, as judges applied other
types of departures to compensate for this effect.8°
The pre-2001 version of section 2L1.2 provided for a sixteen-level
enhancement for any prior crime that was an "aggravated felony," as
71 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(2) (2006).
74 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2008).
75 Id. Section 4B1.2 defines terms used to describe "career offenders," which include
those situations where "(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the
defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense." Id. § 4B 1.1(a). Chapter Four of the Guidelines deals with an
offender's criminal history and the effect of past criminal acts on sentencing for present
offenses. See generally id. ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 788-89 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the history of the crime of violence definition under section 2L1.2).
77 Id. at 788.
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defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)." The graduated (post-2001) structure
offers three options for "specific offense characteristic" enhancements.82
Sixteen-level enhancements are reserved for those felonies judged most
harmful, 83 including "crimes of violence," whereas "aggravated felonies"
now only receive an eight-level enhancement.84
B. THE EVOLUTION OF "FORCIBLE SEX OFFENSE" AS A CRIME OF
VIOLENCE
Disparate interpretations of "forcible sex offense" have roots in the
instability of the definition of crime of violence under both section 2L1.2
and section 4B 1.2. The first independent definition of "crime of violence"
under the new section 2L1.2 reads as follows:
"Crime of violence"-
(I) means an offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; and
(II) includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex
offenses (including sexual abuse of a minor), robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate
extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.
8 5
The two-paragraph format established two "paths" to determine
whether an offense is a crime of violence, mimicking section 4B1.2. In
fact, the first paragraph was identical to that of section 4B1.2, aside from
81 Id. Somewhat confusingly, one of the definitions of "aggravated felony" found in this
title is a "crime of violence" as it is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)-which is not the same
as the definition under the Guidelines. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(F) (2006). The measure
of a crime of violence adopted by 18 U.S.C. § 16 is a lower standard: crimes that "by [their]
nature involve a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006). Conduct
meeting this definition may only be assigned an eight-level increase under the current
section 2LI.2(b)(1)(C). See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, What Constitutes
"Aggravated Felony"for Purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C.A., Providing for
Enhanced Sentence for Illegal Reentry If Defendant Was Previously Deported After
Conviction for Aggravated Felony, 25 A.L.R. FED. 2d 349.
82 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1).
83 The sixteen-level enhancement applies to defendants deported upon conviction of "(i)
a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime
of violence; (iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national security
or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an alien smuggling offense."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A) (2008).
84 Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). Other enhancements include twelve levels for drug trafficking
offenses with sentences of less than thirteen months and four levels for either any felony not
considered to covered by subsections (A) or (B) or for three misdemeanors that are either
crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D)-(E).
85 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.l(B)(ii) (2001) (emphasis
added).
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section 2L1.2's use of the inclusive "and" rather than "or" at the end.8 6 The
second paragraph of both sections enumerated certain offenses that were per
se crimes of violence.87 Section 4B1.2, however, concludes that list with
the open-ended catchall, "or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another."8 8  At least in the
opinion of some courts, the Commission retained the spirit of that definition
in section 2L1.2 by selecting certain crimes as per se crimes of violence
because they "inherently pose an implicit threatened use of force. 8 9
The ordering and the inclusive "and" at the end of the first paragraph,
however, triggered the first reexamination of the section 2L1.2 definition.
The Commission discovered that some courts, in deciding whether a
statutory definition fit within the meaning of an enumerated offense under
the second paragraph, interpreted the Guideline to require the satisfaction of
the first condition as well.90 This "layered" method of interpretation was
not confined to the definition of forcible sex offense, but sex offenses were
early contributors to the eventual split.9'
In 2003, the Commission revised the commentary to section 2L1.2 to
define a crime of violence as follows:
[A]ny of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson,
extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense
under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.
92
The amendment specifically addressed this "layering" of the two
paragraphs. As the Commission explained, "The amended definition makes
clear that the enumerated offenses are always classified as 'crimes of
violence,' regardless of whether the prior offense expressly has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against




88 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B 1.2(a)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
89 United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations omitted); accord United States v. Curtis, 481 F. 3d 836, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
" See infra Part IIl.C, discussing the rise of a circuit split regarding the proper
interpretation of this language.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2004) (interpreting
the 2002 Guidelines).
92 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 658 (2003).
93 Id. (emphasis added). The commentary noted that confusion had arisen in particular in




The Commission further illustrated its clarification by adding statutory
rape and sexual abuse of a minor as enumerated crimes separate from
"forcible sex offenses." By declaring these offenses per se crimes of
violence, the Commission ensured that they would receive the same
sixteen-level enhancement regardless of the fact that both can be
accomplished without physical force.
C. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER "FORCIBLE SEX OFFENSES"
In early 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit faced a question of first impression in United States v. Chacon:
whether a sexual offense that could, by statute, be accomplished with or
without the use of physical force qualified as a "forcible sex offense" for
the purposes of applying the sixteen-level sentencing enhancement for a
crime of violence. 94 The Fourth Circuit, acknowledging a split among its
sister circuits over the force requirement, surveyed the reasoning of both
factions to provide a detailed explanation for its decision to answer the
question presented in the affirmative. 95  Defendant Chacon had been
convicted under a Maryland statute defining second-degree rape as
intercourse accomplished in any of three ways: (1) "by force," (2) with a
victim that is "mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically
helpless," or (3) with a victim who is of or below a certain age.96 To
determine whether the second definition qualified as a forcible sex
offense, 97 the court began its analysis with the ordinary meaning of the
words "forcible" and "force," looking to both lay and legal dictionary
definitions.98 It then noted that the Commission "knew how" to denote the
necessity of physical force, pointing to the use of the modifier "physical"
elsewhere in the commentary to specify the type of force required.99
94 533 F.3d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).
9' Id. at 256-58.
96 Id. at 255 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art 27, § 463 (repealed 2002)). The law was
repealed as part of a reorganization of Maryland statutes and was replaced by an identically-
worded statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-304 (West 2002). The modified
categorical approach was not available in this case, as the charging document did not specify
under which subsection of the offense the defendant was charged.
97 The court acknowledged that both of the other definitions clearly fit within the
definition of forcible sex offense. See Chacon, 533 F.3d at 255.
98 Id. at 257 ("[The] term 'forcible' is used in a wide and somewhat unnatural sense to
include any act of physical interference with the person or property of another." (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (8th ed. 2004))); id. at 257 n.7 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 888 (3d ed. 2002)).
99 Chacon, 533 F.3d at 258.
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Finally, it argued that other enumerated offenses did not require a finding of
physical force to be considered crimes of violence. 100
The Chacon opinion traces the circuit split's origins to 2004, when the
Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Sarmiento-Funes that "assented-to-
but-not-consented-to" sexual conduct did not constitute a forcible sex
offense under the section 2L1.2 definition. 1° 1 The Sarmiento-Funes court
examined a Missouri statute defining sexual assault as a situation in which
the defendant "has sexual intercourse with another person knowing he does
so without that person's consent."' 0 2 The court found that this language
criminalized conduct that neither described a type of bodily injury nor
involved "forcible compulsion."' 1 3 The opinion noted that several states
had "modernized and liberalized their rape laws ... in a few cases even
eliminating the force requirement," but, relying on cases decided more than
a decade earlier (and therefore not reflective of changes in rape laws),
interpreted this trend only as a way for states to distinguish between sex
offenses that do and do not require force.' 0 4 Though the sentence under
review was imposed under the 2002 version of the Guidelines,' 0 5 the court
acknowledged the Commission's statement, accompanying the 2003
amendments, that enumerated offenses were crimes of violence regardless
of whether the use of force was an element. 0 6 The Fifth Circuit failed to
find guidance as to the proper reading of "forcible sex offense" in this
clarification.
10 7
In 2005, however, the Third Circuit faced the same question in the
case of United States v. Remoi. 0 8 The Remoi opinion held that a conviction
under a New Jersey sexual assault statute that did not require physical force
1oo Id.
1o' Id. at 256 (citing United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 344 (5th Cir.
2004); United States v. Bolanos-Hemandez, 492 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007)).
102 Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 343 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.040(1) (1999)).
103 Id. at 344. For an interesting discussion applying a "commodity" theory of sex crimes
proposed by Donald Dripps-separating sex offenses into sexually-motivated physical
assaults and (non-violent) violations of personal autonomy-to the circuit split, see Lucas R.
Franklin, Note, The Laboratory of Judicial Debate: Examining a Commodity Based
Approach to Punishing Sex Offenses, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 309 (2009).
104 Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 344-45 & n.12. In particular the court noted that
Missouri had a separate statute outlawing "forcible rape." Id. at 338.
105 The reviewing court considers the version of the Guidelines under which the sentence
was imposed, rather than the current version at the time of the review or any later
amendments. However, where an amendment is a clarification of an earlier version, rather
than a substantive change, the court may properly take it into consideration. See infra note
135 and accompanying text.
106 Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 344.
107 id.
'0' 404 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2005).
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was nonetheless a "forcible sex offense" for the purposes of the crime of
violence enhancement. 0 9  The statutory section at issue criminalized
intercourse with a physically helpless victim.110 While noting that its
decision was consistent with understandings of statutory rape and sexual
abuse of minors as crimes of violence, this approach was novel as applied
to sex offenses against adult victims."'
The primary differences between the outcomes in the Third and Fifth
Circuits stemmed from different approaches to statutory construction. Both
courts considered the pre-200 3 definition of crime of violence in light of the
2003 amendments but, though both ostensibly began with the "plain
language," identified different starting points for interpretation. The Third
Circuit applied a disjunctive approach to the two-tiered definition,
considering the enumerated offenses-as directed by the 2003
amendments-without regard for whether those offenses required proof of
physical force. 12 The court looked next to the whole of the Guideline's
text to interpret the meaning of "forcible" in context. The analysis included
the fact that the commentary used the modifier "physical" in front of
"forcible" elsewhere in the same comment, suggesting that the absence of
the modifier was a purposeful omission. 113 The court also noted that the
enumerated offenses included several crimes that did not require physical
force, including sex offenses that required only a legal inability to
consent.114 The Tenth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Remoi when faced
with this question, as did the Fourth Circuit in Chacon."5
109 Id. at 794.
110 Id. at 793 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c (West 1990)).
' Id. at 795-96. The Remoi decision acknowledged the Fifth Circuit's recent
Sarmiento-Funes conclusion but found it distinguishable: "The state statute in that case
included any non-consensual intercourse, whether or not the victim was a minor or
incapacitated." Id. at 796.
12 Id. at 794 & n.2, 796. In adopting the disjunctive reading, the Third Circuit noted that
it joined the Tenth, Eleventh, Seventh, Ninth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. Id. at 794 n.2
(citing United States v. Munguia-Sanchez, 365 F.3d 877, 880-81 (10th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Vargas-Gamica, 332 F.3d 471, 473-74 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Pereira-
Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Fuentes-Rivera, 323
F.3d 869, 872 (lth Cir. 2003); United States v. Rayo-Valdez, 302 F.3d 314, 319-20 (5th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 300 F.3d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 2002)).
While this observation was accurate at the time, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, as discussed in
this Part, altered that interpretation in cases following Remoi.
113 id.
114 Id Statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor are both crimes that are defined by the
victim's legal inability to consent based on his or her age; consent-in-fact is not considered a
factor in determining liability. For an interesting discussion of the problem of using legal
inability to consent as a proxy for violence, see Shani Fregia, Statutory Rape: A Crime of
Violence for Purposes of Immigration Deportation?, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 539, 552-57.
15 See United States v. Romero-Hemandez, 505 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2007);
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The Fifth Circuit in Sarmiento-Funes did not detail the reasons for its
holding, relying instead on an earlier case that interpreted a statutory rape
law 1 6 and simply deciding that "forcible" offenses required "something
more" than the conduct criminalized by the statute at issue." 7  In
subsequent decisions, the Fifth Circuit continued to look back to its own
decisions rather than addressing the plain language of the statute in front of
the court.' 8  Perhaps as a consequence, the court continued to use the
formula that if consent in fact was possible under the statutory definition
(even if the person giving consent is not legally "able" to do so), the offense
could not be considered forcible.'" 9
While the Tenth, Third, and Fourth Circuits rejected the Fifth Circuit's
reading, only the Ninth Circuit agreed that enumerated "crime of violence"
offenses required "proof of force" as an element for a prosecution to be
successful. 2 0 However, while the Ninth Circuit reads the "crime of
violence" definition as a layered proposition, its decisions clearly address
the state statute at issue rather than relying on precedential interpretations of
dissimilar state laws as the Fifth Circuit tends to do.' 2' The result appeared
the same at first: in 2007, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Beltran-
Munguia, held that to qualify as a forcible sex offense under the enumerated
part of the section 2L1.2 definition, a statute must "criminalize acts that
necessitate the use of force"; in other words, the use of force beyond that
required to achieve penetration must be an element of the crime. 22 A few
months later, however, the court stepped back from Beltran-Munguia,
holding that the criminalized act must necessitate "force" but not force of
accord United States v. Gonzalez-Jaquez, 566 F.3d 1250, 1252-53 (10th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Yanez-Rodriguez, 555 F.3d 931, 944-45 (10th Cir. 2009). In both Gonzalez-Jaquez
and Yanez-Rodriquez, defendants relied on Ninth and Fifth Circuit cases to argue that
statutes that can be violated by non-violent conduct cannot be crimes of violence, an
argument the Tenth Circuit dismissed as foreclosed by Romero-Hernandez. Gonzalez-
Jaquez, 566 F.3d at 1252-1253; Yanez-Rodriguez, 555 F.3d at 944-45.
116 The case, United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2004), found that
consensual sex made nonconsensual only by the victim's inability to consent because of her
age was not "forcible" as construed in light of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual section
4B 1.2.
117 United States v. Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d 336, 345 (5th Cir. 2004).
118 See United States v. Gomez-Gomez (Gomez I), 493 F.3d 562, 566-67 & n.5 (5th Cir.
2007), rev'd en banc, United States v. Gomez-Gomez (Gomez 11), 547 F.3d 242 (5th Cir.
2008); United States v. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d 331, 333 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Luciano-Rodriquez, 442 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2006).
119 See cases cited supra note 118.
120 See United States v. Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Bolanos-Hemandez, 492 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).
121 Beltran-Munguia, 498 F.3d at 1046-48.
122 Id. at 1048.
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the "heightened level" or "violent nature" needed to meet the "element test"
prong of section 2L1.2.1
23
To this point, the Commission had been silent on the proper definitions
of "crime of violence" and "forcible sex offense" since the 2003 changes.
Continuing divergence in interpretation signaled the need for further
clarification as the time came to propose amendments in 2008. Before any
proposed amendments were published, however, the Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Gomez-Gomez (Gomez /),124 suggested that it was impossible
under the circuit's case law for any statute that did not independently meet
the "element test" to ever be a forcible sex offense. 125 A strongly worded
concurring opinion, however, portended the demise of this line of
reasoning. Recognizing the need to follow precedent, Judge Jolly stated
that doing so "leads to nonsensical results" and "frustrates the intent of the
Sentencing Guidelines"; the Sarmiento-Funes analysis, he claimed, "strips
'forcible sex offense' of any significance independent from the elements
test, and in doing so, tends to contradict rules of statutory construction
requiring that we not render statutory language meaningless. 1 26 A month
earlier, Ninth Circuit Judges Rymer and Tallman made similarly damning
observations about their own circuit's case law, the reasoning of which they
claimed "minimizes a crime effected by exploiting a victim's
helplessness."' 127 Perhaps in response to these public denouncements, the
Commission placed section 2L1.2 squarely back in the crosshairs of its
2008 proposed amendments.
D. THE 2008 AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE DEFINITION
On November 1, 2008, the latest Guideline amendments went into
effect; included among them was an updated version of the commentary to
section 2L1.2 that unequivocally addressed the definition of "forcible sex
offense." The commentary accompanying the amendment is explicit in
clarifying the Commission's intent with regard to the breadth of crimes the
123 Bolanos-Hernandez, 492 F.3d at 1145-46.
124 493 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2007).
121 Id. at 566 n.4. The panel struggled to reconcile its holding with its "outlier" decision
in United States v. Beliew, 492 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2007), which found child molestation to be
forcible-a difference the court justified by claiming that Beliew involved constructive force
achieved by "duress" and "psychological intimidation." Gomez 1, 493 F.3d at 567 n.6.
126 Gomez 1, 493 F.3d at 569-70 (Jolly, J., concurring). Even the majority recognized it
was nearing the brink of conflict, noting the "valuable opportunity for the whole Court to
reconsider [its] precedent in this area." Id. at 567 n.6.
127 Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d at 1053 (Tallman, J., concurring). Both Tallman and
Jolly urged their respective courts to join the Third Circuit's interpretation in United States v.
Remoi, 404 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2005). Beltran-Munguia, 489 F.3d at 1055; Gomez I, 493 F.3d
at 570 (Jolly, J., concurring).
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term is meant to encompass. The disagreement among the appellate
circuits, however, remains.
The new definition is identical to that adopted in 2003 aside from the
addition of a parenthetical phrase; it now reads: "'Crime of violence'
means... forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the conduct is
not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is
involuntary, incompetent, or coerced) .... ,,128
A week before the revised Guidelines went into effect, the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel's ruling in Gomez I, holding that
a sex offense need not require the amount of force necessary to meet the
"element" test under section 2L1.2 in order to be "forcible." 129 However,
the court refused to remove force from the equation entirely, holding
instead that an offense committed using constructive (non-physical) force
"that would cause a reasonable person to succumb" is a forcible sex offense
within the meaning of section 2L1.2.' 30 Writing for the en banc court in
Gomez II, Judge Jolly, the author of the concurrence in the panel opinion,
attempted to reconcile and limit Sarmiento-Funes and decisions construing
section 4B1.2's crime of violence definition with the new holding. 13 1 In
doing so, however, the court both maintained that Sarmiento-Funes "stands
for the limited proposition that a sex offense does not involve the use of
force when the victim consents in fact" and failed to adapt its reasoning to
the amended definition. 1
32
While the court was correct that the definition "in effect at the time of
sentencing governs,' 3 3 it failed to acknowledge the change that was about
to take place. 134 Courts may take amendments of Guidelines that postdate
the conviction into account if the purpose of the amendment is to clarify the
Commission's intent.' 35 Since the sole purpose of the commentary is to aid
interpretation of the Guidelines by clarifying the Commission's intent,
128 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.l(B)(iii) (2008) (emphasis
added).
129 United States v. Gomez-Gomez (Gomez H), 547 F.3d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 246-48.
132 Id. at 246, 248 n.6 (emphasis added). The court noted that section 4B1.2 does not
include statutory rape and sexual abuse of a minor (both of which are based upon legal,
rather than factual consent) and declined to decide whether "forcible sex offense" under that
section should have the same meaning.
131 id. at 248 n.6 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), 3742(g)(1) (2006)).
134 Id. at 248 n.7.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 2005) ("'[W]hen an
amendment is a mere clarification, rather than a substantive change to the Guidelines, its
application does not violate the ex post facto clause."' (quoting United States v. Brennan,




courts should properly take any further clarification into account.
Gomez II split hairs among the circuit's own precedent, rather than heeding
the clear directives of the Commission. The Commission went so far as to
cite the case law of the Fifth Circuit as the impetus for further amendment,
stating that the new definition "would result in an outcome that is contrary
to cases excluding crimes in which 'there may be assent in fact but no
legally valid consent' from the scope of 'forcible sex offenses.""'137 As
138
examples of such cases, the Commission listed Gomez I, United States v.
Luciano-Rodriguez,39 and United States v. Sarmiento-Funes,140 all of which
are Fifth Circuit cases decided after the enactment of the 2003 amendments.
IV. OVERLAP WITH, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR, RAPE LAW
While the circuits may have split over statutory interpretation, the
backbone of the conflict is the vast array of state laws criminalizing rape
and other sexual misconduct.14' Because the controversy over "crime of
violence" and "forcible sex offense" has to do with the presence (or
absence) of physical force, it is important to consider the meaning and use
of force in the context of sex crimes.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. RAPE LAW
Three major concepts dictate the definitions and discussion
surrounding rape law: force, resistance, and consent. 42  William
Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, defined rape as "carnal
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will,' ' 4 3 but included
within the crime "cases in which intercourse was had without conscious or
voluntary consent."' 144 However, rape law throughout much of the history
of the United States has required that force be present and that its presence
be demonstrated through resistance by the victim. Laws range from
136 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993) ("Amended commentary is binding
on the federal courts... , and prior judicial constructions of a particular guideline cannot
prevent the [Sentencing] Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation .... "); see
also Remoi, 404 F.3d at 795.
137 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 632 (2008).
'3 493 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2007).
'3 442 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2006).
'40 374 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2004).
141 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
142 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 18 (1998).
143 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210 (1769).
144 Norman S. Goldner, Rape as a Heinous but Understudied Offense, 63 J. CRIM. L.,
CRMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 402, 402 (1972) (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 143).
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requiring a victim to "resist to the utmost" 145 to defining force as that which
would overcome reasonable resistance. 1
46
The late twentieth century saw significant movement in the
development of rape law, as reformers pushed to remove resistance
requirements and, more generally, to move the focus of rape law away from
the actions of the victim.147 The Model Penal Code, for example, removed
consent from the definition of rape' 48 in an attempt to focus on the conduct
of the perpetrator, and most state laws by the mid-1970s had (at least on
their faces) abandoned resistance requirements. 49 Feminist reformers, even
while attempting to frame rape as a violation of personal autonomy and free
choice, supported the move to a focus on force, as removing focus from the
actions of the victim simultaneously helped to combat myths and
stereotypes attached to victims of sex crimes.
50
However, the result was a recodification of the traditional conception
of rape as a "crime of physical violence," a definition that continues to
inform the law surrounding sex offenses.' 5' The allegorical story of the
stranger jumping out of the bushes with a knife to rape an unsuspecting
victim is an appealing means of creating distance between "regular" and
criminal sexual behavior, but statistics show this kind of scenario is by far
the minority even among reported cases of sexual assault.' 52 Indeed, almost
three-fourths of sexual assaults are perpetrated by someone the victim
knows.' 53 Two-thirds of these incidents take place in the victim's home or
that of a friend, neighbor, or relative. 1
5 4
145 Only one state currently retains this extreme version of resistance; the Louisiana
definition of aggravated rape requires force that overcomes efforts to "resist the act to the
utmost," though forcible rape requires only "reasonable" efforts to resist. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14:42, 14:42.1 (2007).
146 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1962) (defining "Gross Sexual
Imposition," a third-degree felony, as sexual intercourse to which the victim is compelled to
submit "by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution").
147 SCHULHOFER, supra note 142, at 31.
148 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.
149 SCHULHOFER, supra note 142, at 31-36.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 39 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276 (N.J.
1992) ("The [State] Legislature's concept of sexual assault and the role of force was
significantly colored by its understanding of the law of assault and battery.").
152 The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network estimates that 60% of sexual assaults are
unreported. See Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, Reporting Rape,
http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
153 Id.; Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, The Offenders: The Rapist Isn't a
Masked Stranger, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/sexual-assault-offenders




Based in part on improved (if far from perfect) information, modem
scholarship attempts to frame sex offenses based not on the physical harm
they incur, but rather on the violation of the victim's dignity or autonomy.
As a California court put it,
[T]he fundamental wrong at which the law of rape is aimed is not the application of
physical force that causes physical harm. Rather, the law of rape primarily guards the
integrity of a woman's will and the privacy of her sexuality from an act of intercourse
undertaken without her consent .... [I]n this scenario, "force" plays merely a
supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an act of intercourse has been
undertaken against a victim's will.
155
Such a view encompasses an understanding that the thin line between
consensual sexual contact and forcible sex offenses turns on the factual (and
legally recognized)1 56 consent of one party rather than the use of any kind of
force-physical, constructive, or otherwise.
This distinction is one reason why sex offenses are categorically
difficult to define and police: the acts that constitute many such crimes are
not illegal in and of themselves. Similarly, consent is not a defense in other
offenses involving the infliction of serious bodily injury. Liability for
sexual contact fundamentally turns on the consent of the victim regardless
of whether the particular state statute expresses that concept by way of
force, resistance, nonconsent, or lack of affirmative consent. Some states
and courts recognize consent as determinative and have adjusted their laws
(or interpretations of their laws) accordingly; a handful are even edging
toward requiring proof of affirmative consent to avoid liability. 5 7  This
approach, however, remains distinctly in the minority; one extreme of a
spectrum countered at the opposite end by esoteric schemes based on
outmoded moral underpinnings.
58
B. COMPARING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTES
By way of illustration, compare the underlying definitions of two state
statutes considered by the Fifth Circuit. The circuit's confusing case law
attempts to draw a line between sexual contact that is legally, as opposed to
155 People v. Cicero, 157 Cal. App. 3d 465,475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
156 The distinction noted is that a victim who is legally unable to consent by virtue of
age, mental incapacity, or incapacitation due to alcohol or drug use may consent "in fact,"
but that consent is not legally valid.
157 See KADISH ET AL., supra note 68, at 307-08.
158 Id; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. Resistance requirements have
traditionally been seen as acceptable because women, it was assumed, would fight to the
utmost to protect their virginity or remain sexually pure. For further discussion of the impact
of changing views on women on rape laws, see Erin G. Palmer, Antiquated Notions of
Womanhood and the Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why Post-Penetration Rape Should Be
a Crime in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1258 (2003).
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factually, unconsented and relies heavily on the semantic differences among
statutes.
In Sarmiento-Funes, the court interpreted a narrow Missouri statute
which defines sexual assault as sexual intercourse accomplished in the
absence of consent.159 The court found it important (if not "determinative")
that Missouri had a separate statute criminalizing forcible rape.160 Missouri
separates sexual offenses into twenty sections, defining with some precision
the narrow category of conduct proscribed by each.16' The Missouri
legislature defined its most serious category of sex offenses to reflect the
common law understanding of rape: "physical force that overcomes
reasonable resistance, or a threat that places a person in reasonable fear of
death, serious physical injury or kidnapping."' 162  The choice to align a
single statutory section with the common law definition does not, as the
Fifth Circuit suggests, imply that the Missouri legislature intended sexual
penetration only under these circumstances to be considered forcible.
63
The legislature simply opted to delineate and grade sexual offenses
narrowly, reflecting a desire to mete out punishment proportionate to the
crime.
By contrast, the California Penal Code contains the entirety of its
164
criminal sanctions for rape and related offenses within a single provision.'
The Fifth Circuit recognized in Sarmiento-Funes that the wording of a
statute does not necessarily answer the question of whether the crime it
describes "inherently involves the use of force."' 165  However, where
Sarmiento-Funes analyzed a discrete slice of an extensive code, Gomez I
and Gomez II (along with several other decisions of the Ninth Circuit)
considered all of the conduct criminalized under California sex offense law.
Gomez I concluded that a crime of violence enhancement was improper
because one could violate a single subsection of that law by threatening
"hardship" upon a victim to obtain consent. 166 Of the entire body of rape
"9 374 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.040(1) (1999)).
160 Id. at 339.
161 Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 566.030-566.151 (1999 & Supp. 2008). This number does not
include offenses such as sex trafficking, forced labor, registration requirements, or
definitions of terms and defenses.
162 Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.030, Comment to the 1973 Proposed Code (1999).
163 See supra Parts III.C & IV.A (discussing the expansion of the common law concept
of force).
164 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (1999).
165 Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 339 n.4.
166 United States v. Gomez-Gomez (Gomez 1), 493 F.3d 562, 564-65 (5th Cir. 2007),
rev'd en banc, United States v. Gomez-Gomez (Gomez 1), 547 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 2008).
California removed "hardship" from the definition of duress before Gomez I was decided but
after the defendant was convicted. Gomez 1, 493 F.3d at 565 n.2. The Fifth Circuit noted
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law, the court found this single word negated the "forcible" nature of the
crime, since "hardship" did not imply physical duress. 167 Notably, though
the Sarmiento-Funes panel deemed the existence of a separate "rape"
statute under Missouri law instructive, 168 the same court in the Gomez
decisions explicitly refused to take any meaning from the fact that the
California legislature decided to label the crime at issue "forcible rape.',
169
V. WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED-AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
ABOUT IT?
While the issues encountered by the circuit split are interesting
questions, one may wonder just why the definition of a single phrase in the
commentary attached to one of several subsections of a single advisory
sentencing guideline is important. In many individual cases, the answer is
that it is not. How the definition of "forcible sex offense" is resolved
generally, however, has implications for federalism, rape law, the purposes
of punishment advanced by the Guidelines, and the criminalization of
immigration offenses. While the resolution offered by the Commission's
2008 amendments should improve the clarity of sentencing decisions from
a judicial perspective (if not from that of the offenders), the repercussions
for the meaning of rape and other sex offenses is less clear.
A. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Whether the Commission's clarifications will, on balance, lead to
overall positive effects is an open question. The criminalization of illegal
reentry has had a major impact on the character of federal criminal
enforcement. Section 2L1.2 provides the sentencing structure for one of the
most commonly prosecuted federal offenses; of the 76,669 cases in the last
fiscal year in which a court applied any Sentencing Guideline, 13,627 of
those cases (or 19.3%) used section 2L1.2 as the primary Guideline. 170
Immigration offenders received 28.2% of all Guidelines sentences last
year.171 The only Guideline applied more frequently 172 is section 2D1.1,
that this amendment would likely have changed the outcome of the case. Id. Indeed, the en
banc court, interpreting "hardship" differently, reversed the panel decision, finding that the
enhancement was appropriate where "constructive force" (such as that created by hardship)
was present. Gomez I1, 547 F.3d at 249.
167 Gomez 1, 493 F.3d at 564-65.
168 Sarmiento-Funes, 374 F.3d at 339.
169 Gomez 1, 493 F.3d at 566 n.3.






which provides sentencing for a large number of federal offenses relating to
the manufacture, importation and exportation, and even simple possession
of illegal drugs. 173 Non-citizens made up 37.4% of all offenders sentenced
under the Guidelines last year and more than 90% of all immigration
offenders received prison time.'
74
Many politicians embrace being "tough" on immigration in the same
way in which they embrace being tough on crime.' 75 The result has been a
dramatic rise in charges filed against illegal immigrants both at the point of
initial entry and upon reentry. 176 The Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security are working with the federal district courts to meet a goal of
processing one hundred immigration prosecutions per day.177  In some
ways, the overlap of criminal and immigration law makes perfect sense:
both areas of law deal with the status of an individual's relationship with
the state and operate essentially to include or exclude an individual from
society. 78 However, criminal law is traditionally a state function, governed
by a variety of constitutional guarantees that do not apply to noncitizens
79
with well-defined objectives informing the punishment scheme.
80
Considering the objectives that the Sentencing Guidelines seek to
promote---"just punishment, rehabilitation, deterrence, and
incapacitation"181-the immigration context seems an unlikely avenue for
success. When the state imprisons someone they intend to deport upon
release, there is no motivation to rehabilitate that individual. 82 Because the
173 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2008).
174 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 27-28 (2007). The Commission noted
that the annual report relies on the appropriate documentation being sent in on time, and
often the report does not reflect all sentences determined within the relevant timeframe. Id.
at 25.
175 See Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Prosecutions Hit New High, WASH. POST, June 2,
2006, at Al.
176 Id.
177 Id. Of course, these include misdemeanor illegal border-crossing prosecutions, but
the increase in resource allocation and prosecutorial attention is indicative of the sea change
in criminal enforcement.
178 See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 367, 403-12 (2006).
179 The rights of criminal defendants are guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, whereas immigration proceedings generally are subject only to the
due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. See Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, supra
note 9, at 265 & n.36.
180 Id.; see also Stumpf, Crimmigration, supra note 178.
181 See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 174, at 1.
182 See, e.g., United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1990) ("When
setting the offense level for entry after deportation, the Sentencing Commission would




reentry statute is essentially "strict liability" (and therefore nearly always
results in a guilty plea),183 the sentence turns solely on the categorical or
modified categorical interpretation of the statute defining the underlying
offense; there is no room in either the guilt or sentencing phases for
individualization. While the presence of a "prior felony" or "aggravated
felony" under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) remains insulated from the constitutional
guarantee that facts leading to conviction be found by a jury, 1 4 a vague
understanding of these terms only further obfuscates the goal of
transparency in sentencing and increases sentencing disparities. A crime of
violence enhancement can double, triple, or quadruple a sentence (or more,
if the crime also qualifies under the career offender provision of section
4B1.2 as a "crime of violence"-a lower standard).185  The categorical
inquiry that appears so sterile can seriously threaten the liberty interests of
the defendant where the procedural guarantees normally in place are not
present.
Though some argue that an individual defendant's liberty interests are
not threatened under a system of advisory Guidelines because the
sentencing court is not obligated to impose the recommended sentence, the
influence of the Guidelines remains strong. Federal prosecutors, following
the direction of top officials, continue to request sentences consistent with
the Guidelines' ranges.'8 6 The composition of the federal judiciary, which,
at the time of the implementation of the Guidelines, expressed strong
resistance to the stifling of their sentencing discretion, has also changed.
Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts laments the
"extraordinary attitudinal shift" she observes among her peers: more judges
expressing a belief that the Guidelines achieve the purposes of sentencing-
but also expressing a distinct lack of confidence in their ability to exercise
discretion. 
87
183 The Sentencing Commission reported that 99.3% of offenders convicted of
immigration crimes plead guilty in order to obtain departures under plea bargains. 2008
SENTENCING STATISTIC SOURCEBOOK, supra note 170, fig.A.
184 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1998) (finding that 8
U.S.C. § 1326(b) lays out sentencing factors rather than a separate criminal offense from that
defined by § 1326(a)). For further discussion, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
185 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A, sent'g tbl. (2008).
186 On January 28, 2005, a few days after the Booker opinion was released, Deputy
Attorney-General James B. Comey issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors charging
that they "must take all steps necessary to ensure adherence to the Sentencing Guidelines...
[and] must actively seek sentences within the range established by the Sentencing Guidelines
in all but extraordinary cases." Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., to
All Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencinglawand_policy/files/dagjan_28_comey_memoon booker.pdf.
187 Judge Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and
Sentencing, 4 OHIO. ST. J. C~iM. L. 523, 538 (2007).
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Without the exercise of some discretion, however, the amended
definition of "forcible sex offense" subjects offenders to the strictest
interpretation found among any of the states: that any nonconsensual sexual
contact merits the same enhancement as murder, assault, or extortion.
88
This conflation also implicates rape and sex offense law on a more
general scale. On the one hand, a hardline view that all unconsented
contact is equally culpable simplifies judicial administration and promotes
the goal of consistency in one sense. By calling all sex offenses forcible,
the Commission states that sex offenders are a danger to the public
regardless of the means by which they accomplish their purpose, because
the harm caused does not depend on the method employed. On the other
hand, however, this leveling also recodifies, yet again, the idea that rape is,
at its core, a crime of violence. This result not only ignores the important
characteristics that make sex crimes unique but also frustrates the
Commission's purpose of using the "crime of violence" distinction to create
graded offenses.
A striking example of this "right analysis, wrong outcome" comes
from the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Romero-Hernandez.,89 The
defendant was removed from the country after serving time for his
conviction for unlawful sexual contact in Colorado. 90 Unlawful sexual
contact is a misdemeanor under Colorado law1 9' but was characterized as a
felony for purposes of federal sentencing because certain parts of the statute
are punishable by more than a year in prison.192 The court, applying a
modified categorical approach and following the logic recently approved by
the Commission, found that Romero-Hernandez's conduct warranted a
crime of violence enhancement as a forcible sex offense.' 93  The
presentence report revealed that Romero-Hemandez grabbed the breasts and
thigh of his (clothed) victim but retreated after she slapped him away.
194
Reprehensible? Of course. A crime of violence, equivalent to murder and
deserving of a sentence enhanced four to five times in length? Surely not.
B. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: A NEW DEFINITION
Since the 2001 amendment to section 2L1.2 created a more nuanced
enhancement scheme, the Commission has continually expanded the
definition of "crime of violence." Given that the stated purpose of the two-
'88 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.l(B)(iii) (2008).
' 505 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2007).
190 Id. at 1084.
191 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-404(1) (West 2002).
192 Id.; Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d at 1084.
193 Romero-Hernandez, 505 F.3d at 1089.
194 Id. at 1085 n.1.
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tiered structure was to limit the scope of the greatest enhancement to the
most dangerous crimes, this expansion seems counterintuitive. 95  By
attempting to keep pace with developing understandings of what conduct is
most culpable (and to remain faithful to the state understandings of those
crimes), the Commission has run afoul of that purpose.
A crime of violence is just one of seven ways in which a defendant can
receive the greatest sentencing enhancement under section 2L1.2. The
sixteen-level increase is also applied to felony convictions for "(i) a drug
trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months...;
(iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national
security or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an
alien smuggling offense."'1 96  Judicial interpretation has so expanded the
meaning of "crimes of violence" that nearly all of these separately
enumerated offenses could fall under the umbrella of "crime of violence."
'1 97
By constantly changing the understanding of "violence," the Commission
and the courts dilute the meaning of a powerful term and subsume the
nuanced language of the Guideline.
The 2008 amendment is a good example of the problems with
expansion. By broadening the definition of "forcible sex offense" to
include those situations where consent "is not given or is not legally valid,"
the Commission respects the development of rape law and recognizes that
the harm of sexual assault comes not from its physical impact, but from the
violation of the victim's ability to make free decisions about sexual contact.
However, it also renders the separate inclusion of statutory rape and sexual
abuse of a minor superfluous under general rules of statutory
interpretation.198 It also imposes the consequences of a crime of violence
195 Recall that the purpose of the 2001 amendment was to respond to concerns that the
blanket enhancement for "aggravated felony" resulted in no distinction between more and
less dangerous offenders and often resulted in overly harsh punishments for the less
"dangerous"-and that the Commission severed section 2L1.2 from the section 4B1.2
definition of "crime of violence" because the "substantial risk" test was deemed too low a
standard to serve that purpose.
196 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(I)(A) (2008).
197 For example, the creation and distribution of child pornography is illegal for the very
reason that it is deemed per se harmful to children. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
757, 759 (1982) ("The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by
juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children .... ).
198 Though courts attempt to interpret statutes so as to give effect to all the words of the
statute and not render any language superfluous, see, for example, TRWlnc. v. Andrews, 534
U.S. 19, 31 (2001), rules of statutory construction dictate that the promulgator of the rule
should avoid language that may merit such an interpretation or otherwise overstep its
authority. Cf GHS Health Maint. Org., Inc. v. United States, 536 F.3d 1293, 1301-02 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (explaining that deference to the agency issuing a regulation was not appropriate




on crimes that depend on an understanding of consent, power, and language
that may be beyond the understanding of a noncitizen.
The remedy may be so simple as to seem unworkable: remove
"forcible sex offenses" from the definition of crime of violence and create a
separate category. By doing so, the Commission can still apply a crime of
violence enhancement to those sex offenses that are, in fact, violent
crimes-but can also make a separate determination as to the appropriate
sanction for the dangerousness and threat inherent in sex offenses as they
are defined by modem understanding. A separate category would also
allow gradation within the Guideline itself rather than only within the
commentary, and encourage further study and development of the
implications of this type of enhancement. State laws recognize sex offenses
as inherently different, and the sentences those crimes elicit should reflect
the same. Where exactly this new category of enhancement fits is beyond
the scope of this recommendation, but the Commission's expertise renders
it well-suited to such an inquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a contentious circuit split, the Commission has taken the side of the
majority, opting to apply a sixteen-level "crime of violence" enhancement
for all crimes involving unconsented sexual contact. Even assuming the
circuits come into line with the Commission's clear directive, the continued
expansion of the crime of violence enhancement for illegal reentry
sentencing may raise more questions than it answers. While the sticky
issues surrounding criminal penalties for immigration violations are
unlikely to disappear, one way for the Commission to simplify and narrow
the implications of section 2L1.2's sentencing scheme is to remove
"forcible sex offense" from the ever-expanding "crime of violence"
definition.
By separating sex offenses from crimes that find their origins in the
threat of violence or other physical bodily harm, the Commission could
incorporate the contemporary understanding of sex offenses as distinct
from, but not necessarily less harmful than, crimes of violence. Starting
from a clean slate, the Commission could reconsider the utility of
sentencing enhancements to punish based on such conduct without the
present and precedential ripple effects necessarily created by constantly
changing the meaning of "crime of violence."
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